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TRUSTS AND ESTATES: 
IMPLEMENTING FREEDOM OF DISPOSITION 
ROBERT H. SITKOFF* 
The Trusts and Estates course is about the law of gratuitous transfer at 
death, that is, the law of succession.1 Lately such courses have come to cover 
both probate succession by will and intestacy, and nonprobate succession by 
inter vivos trust, pay-on-death contract, and other such will substitutes. The 
organizing principle of the American law of succession, both probate and 
nonprobate, is freedom of disposition. My suggestion in this Essay, which I 
have implemented in my Trusts and Estates class and in the casebook for 
which I am the surviving coauthor,2 is that the Trusts and Estates course can 
likewise be organized around this principle. The Trusts and Estates course is 
perhaps best conceptualized as a survey of the law and policy of implementing 
freedom of disposition.3 
I.  INTRODUCTION: FREEDOM OF DISPOSITION 
The American law of succession embraces freedom of disposition, 
authorizing dead hand control, to an extent that is unique among modern legal 
 
* John L. Gray Professor of Law, Harvard University. This Essay draws freely without attribution 
from JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES (9th ed. 2013). 
The author thanks Randy Roth and Max Schanzenbach for their extensive comments on the 
portions of the book from which this Essay is derived, and Terri Saint-Amour for superb research 
support. In accordance with Harvard Law School’s policy on conflicts of interest, the author 
discloses certain outside activities, one or more of which may relate to the subject matter of this 
Essay, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/COI/2013_Sitkoff_Robert.html. 
 1. Other common names for this course are Estates and Trusts; Wills and Trusts; and 
Decedent’s Estates. A few years ago, at the outset of my tenure as Chair of the Executive 
Committee of the relevant Section within the Association of American Law Schools, we changed 
the Section’s name from Donative Transfers, Fiduciaries and Estate Planning to Trusts and 
Estates. We reasoned that Trusts and Estates was less cumbersome, more intuitive, and more in 
accord with how most instructors self identify. 
 2. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES (9th ed. 
2013). 
 3. My focus, therefore, is on second-order questions of design rather than the first-order 
question of why freedom of disposition, on which see, for example, the sources cited in infra note 
9. 
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systems.4 Within the American legal tradition, a property owner may exclude 
his or her blood relations and subject his or her dispositions to ongoing 
conditions, as in the classic teaching case of Shapira v. Union National Bank.5 
The right of a property owner to dispose of his or her property on terms that he 
or she chooses has come to be recognized as a separate stick in the bundle of 
rights called property.6 
There are, of course, some limits on freedom of disposition. The law 
protects a decedent’s creditors and surviving spouse, and it imposes a handful 
of other policy limitations, such as the Rule Against Perpetuities. Gratuitous 
transfer of property, whether during life or at death, is also subject to wealth 
transfer taxes.7 For the most part, however, the American law of succession 
facilitates, rather than regulates, the carrying out of the decedent’s intent. Most 
of the law of succession is concerned with enabling posthumous enforcement 
of the actual intent of the decedent or, failing this, giving effect to the 
decedent’s probable intent.8 
Notice the emphasis on the donor rather than the donee. The interest 
protected by the law of succession is the donor’s right to freedom of 
disposition. The interest of a prospective donee, being derivative of the donor’s 
freedom of disposition, does not harden into a cognizable legal right until the 
donor’s death. Until then, a prospective beneficiary has a mere expectancy that 
is subject to defeasance at the donor’s whim. Consequently, the justification 
for freedom of disposition must be found in the balance of the “proper rewards 
and socially valuable incentives to the donor”9 against the risk of perpetuating 
inequality and concentrating economic and political power. 
Along with the nature and function of freedom of disposition, it is 
convenient at the outset of the Trusts and Estates course to consider the 
professional responsibility of lawyers in succession matters. Doing so alerts 
 
 4. See, e.g., RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN DEAD 6–7 (2010). 
 5. Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ohio C.P. 1974); see also Ronald J. 
Scalise, Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (2011); Joshua C. 
Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 445 (2006). 
 6. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 
33. 
 7. Such taxes were upheld in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1921) 
(estate tax), and Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 137–38 (1929) (gift tax). 
 8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmts. a, c (2003). 
 9. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1–4, in DEATH, TAXES AND 
FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 5–6 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); see also Adam J. Hirsch & 
William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 5–6 (1992); Daniel 
B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2013). 
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students to the ethical perils in trusts and estates practice,10 and it invites 
consideration of the role of the trusts and estates lawyer as family counselor. 
Because the exercise of freedom of disposition at death is the decedent’s final 
expressive act, the Trusts and Estates course is fundamentally about people and 
their most intimate relationships. Each case is a drama in human relationships 
and a cautionary tale. 
II.  INTESTACY: AN ESTATE PLAN BY DEFAULT 
A person who dies with a will is said to die testate. The probate property of 
such a person is distributed in accordance with the person’s will. But at least 
half of the U.S. population dies without a will. Distribution of the probate 
property of these people, who are said to die intestate, is governed by the 
default rules of the law of intestacy. If a will disposes of only part of the 
probate estate, the result is a partial intestacy in which the probate property not 
disposed of by the will passes by intestacy. Intestacy is therefore the 
background law that supplies an estate plan by default for intestate decedents. 
Intestacy also influences norms of testamentary disposition and supplies 
constructional rules that figure in the interpretation of wills, trusts, and other 
will substitutes. 
In accordance with the principle of freedom of disposition, the primary 
objective in designing an intestacy statute is to carry out the probable intent of 
the typical intestate decedent—that is, to provide majoritarian default rules for 
property succession at death. Unfortunately, this task often involves substantial 
guesswork, as the disparate preferences of persons without a will must be 
aggregated into a model intestate decedent.11 Evolving social norms have made 
this undertaking increasingly difficult, as family and family-like relationships 
have become more varied and complex. Multiple marriages, same-sex 
marriages, blended families, adoption, and unmarried cohabitation have 
become increasingly common. Medical science now offers the making of a 
baby without coitus. The egg, sperm, and womb needed to make a baby can be 
provided by three different persons, the first two even after the person has died, 
and the intention of all involved might be for still other persons to function as 
the parents of the baby. Discerning who is a child of whom for inheritance 
purposes has become complex.12 
 
 10. A study by the American Bar Association found that between 2008 and 2011 a bit more 
than ten percent of all ethics complaints involved a trusts and estates matter. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 
PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2008–2011 5 (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and 
Demographic Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 56 (2009). 
 12. See, e.g., Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 899, 899–900 (2012). 
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In light of evolving family and family-like relationships, to track the 
probable intent of the typical intestate decedent, the law of intestacy must 
likewise evolve. But on some issues, there is no clear majoritarian preference 
or preferences may be in flux. In such circumstances, should legislators favor 
the traditional view or the one that seems to be emerging? Should legislators 
look to how the issue is typically addressed in professionally drafted wills? 
Should the law of inheritance, which is oriented toward implementing the 
probable intent of the typical decedent, consider also the family law policy of 
the best interests of the child? 
Manifestly, teaching the law of intestacy need not entail a dry survey of 
mechanical rules. Policy debate over intestacy is fraught with questions of 
morality and the proper role of the state in establishing social norms. Some 
have argued that shaping social norms and other such policies are appropriate 
considerations in designing intestacy statutes. Thus, some have advocated for 
the recognition of unmarried committed partners, both same-sex and opposite-
sex, as intestate takers on the grounds that this would be a validation of the 
propriety of such relationships. Other commentators have pushed back, arguing 
against the use of intestacy laws to shape social norms.13 The stakes extend 
beyond intestate succession, because the law of intestacy supplies rules of 
construction applicable to wills, trusts, and other will substitutes. Intestacy law 
is also influential or even determinative of other questions, such as who 
qualifies for Social Security survivor benefits.14 
III.  WILLS: FORMALITIES AND FORMS 
The probate code of every state includes a provision, known for historical 
reasons as the Wills Act, which prescribes rules for making a valid will. A 
person who makes a will, known as a testator, is said to die testate. The 
probate property of a testate decedent is distributed in accordance with the 
decedent’s will. By complying with the Wills Act, a testator can ensure that his 
or her property is distributed in accordance with his or her actual intent rather 
than the presumed intent of intestacy. In this way, the Wills Act implements 
the principle of freedom of disposition. 
 
 13. See, e.g., RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY (2004); 
Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199 (2001); Susan 
N. Gary, The Probate Definition of Family: A Proposal for Guided Discretion in Intestacy, 45 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 787 (2012); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in 
Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031 (2004); Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Honor Thy 
Father and Mother?: How Intestacy Law Goes Too Far in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 171 (2006); E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of 
Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063 (1999); Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or 
Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. 
L. REV. 273 (2010). 
 14. See Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2028–33 (2012). 
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A will is a peculiar legal instrument, however, in that it does not take effect 
until after the testator dies. As a consequence, probate courts follow what has 
been called a “worst evidence” rule of procedure.15 The witness who is best 
able to authenticate the will, to verify that it was voluntarily made, and to 
clarify the meaning of its terms is dead by the time the court considers such 
issues. The law of wills must therefore overcome the worst evidence problem 
in discerning the authenticity, the voluntariness, and the meaning of a will. 
Let us begin with the question of authenticity. The Wills Act of every state 
requires compliance with particular formalities for making or revoking a will.16 
The main purpose of these formalities is to enable a court easily and reliably to 
discern the authenticity of a purported act of testation.17 The Wills Act also 
serves protective, cautionary, and channeling functions. The challenge is to 
prescribe a set of formalities, and a rule for the exactness with which those 
formalities must be complied, that balances the risk of probating an inauthentic 
will with the risk of denying probate to an authentic will.18 Both kinds of error 
dishonor the decedent’s freedom of disposition. The former gives effect to a 
false expression of testamentary intent; the latter denies effect to a true 
expression of testamentary intent. 
Under traditional law, a will may be admitted to probate only if it is in 
strict compliance with the formal requirements of the applicable Wills Act. 
The will must be in writing, signed by the testator, and attested by at least two 
witnesses. Any additional requirements that might be mandated by the 
applicable Wills Act must also be satisfied exactly.19 The strict compliance 
rule guards against a spurious finding of authenticity—a false positive. A 
competent person not subject to undue influence, duress, or fraud is unlikely to 
execute an instrument in strict compliance with all of the Wills Act formalities 
unless the person intends the instrument to be his or her will. But by 
establishing a conclusive presumption of invalidity for an imperfectly executed 
instrument, the strict compliance rule denies probate even if the defect is 
innocuous and there is overwhelming evidence of authenticity—a false 
negative.20 
 
 15. John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2046 (1994) (book review). 
 16. Formalities for making a testamentary disposition are ubiquitous across legal systems. 
See 1 COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION LAW: TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES (Kenneth G.C. Reid, 
Marius J. de Waal & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2011). 
 17. See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 
YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1941). 
 18. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
489 (1975). 
 19. See JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2013 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING tbl. 1 
(2012) (collecting state Wills Act requirements). 
 20. See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 877–82 (2012). 
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Modern law has shifted the balance, reflecting a different calculus of error 
costs and decision costs, by reducing the number of required formalities and by 
relaxing the exactness with which they must be satisfied. The Wills Act of the 
Uniform Probate Code requires only the bare minimum formalities of writing, 
signature, and attestation.21 The harmless error rule, now adopted in ten states, 
reworks the conclusive presumption of invalidity for an imperfect execution 
into a rebuttable presumption that can be overcome with clear and convincing 
evidence that the decedent intended the instrument to be his or her will.22 An 
emerging difficulty in the modern cases, therefore, is in differentiating 
evidence of the decedent’s dispositive intent from evidence that the decedent 
meant for a particular instrument to be controlling of his or her dispositions at 
death.23 
Revocation of wills raises mirror-image questions of authenticity, 
complicated by the need to allow for physical act revocation. A testator who, 
say, urinates on and then sets fire to his or her will has communicated that he 
or she no longer wants his property to be distributed at death in accordance 
with that will.24 What useful purpose is served by denying effect to this clearly 
manifested revocatory intent? The question of authenticity is also at play in 
applying the doctrines of integration, incorporation by reference, republication 
by codicil, and acts of independent significance. Under those doctrines, 
unattested documents or lifetime acts may determine who takes what from the 
testator’s estate. Still another area in which the question of authenticity is 
raised is in contracts to make or not to revoke a will. Because the worst 
evidence problem pertains to such contracts, most states subject them to the 
Statute of Frauds or at least require proof by clear and convincing evidence. 
IV.  WILLS: CAPACITY AND CONTESTS 
As we have seen, by making a will a person can direct the distribution of 
his or her probate property at death, overriding the default distribution of 
intestacy. But what if a will, although properly executed and so authentic, was 
not voluntarily made? It follows from the principle of freedom of disposition 
that only a volitional act of testation should be enforced. Enter the will contest. 
In a will contest, the contestant alleges that a will executed with proper 
formalities was nonetheless not volitional because of the incapacity of the 
 
 21. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a) (2008). 
 22. See id. § 2-503; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 3.3 (2003). For a listing of the ten states and a map, see DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, 
supra note 2, at 184–85. 
 23. Compare In re Probate of Will and Codicil of Macool, 3 A.3d 1258, 1262–64 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (making this point), with In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d 931, 933–34 
(Mont. 2000) (blurring the distinction). 
 24. See In re Estate of Stoker, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
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testator or the undue influence, duress, or fraud of another. The mirror-image 
claim, that the decedent would have made a new will but for the undue 
influence, duress, or fraud of another, is also possible. An unexecuted will 
cannot be probated, but the decedent’s frustrated intent can be honored in 
restitution, preventing unjust enrichment, by imposing a constructive trust in 
favor of the decedent’s intended beneficiary.25 
The complication in these matters, as before, is the worst evidence rule of 
probate procedure whereby the best witness is dead by the time the question is 
litigated. The line between indelicate but lawful persuasion on the one hand, 
and undue influence and duress on the other, can be difficult to assess in 
posthumous litigation. Distinguishing between the peculiarities of old age and 
true mental infirmity can be equally vexing. Judges and juries may be tempted 
to find undue influence or incapacity if the testator’s dispositions seem unfair 
or unnatural.26 
The law attempts to balance the risk of giving effect to an involuntary act 
of testation (a false positive) with the risk of denying effect to a voluntary one 
(a false negative). If courts are too reluctant to set aside a will, the 
unscrupulous will find profit in subverting vulnerable testators. But if courts 
are too willing to set aside a will, disappointed expectant beneficiaries will find 
profit in holding up an estate with a contest meant to extract a settlement. The 
difficult task for lawmakers is in striking the right balance. And the difficult 
task for practicing lawyers is in planning for and avoiding a will contest if 
warning signs are present.27 
The voluntariness of a will can be put into issue by a claim of mental 
incapacity or insane delusion, which is a question of status, or by a claim of 
wrongdoing by a third party in the form of undue influence, duress, or fraud, 
which is a question of conduct. In practice, status and conduct claims tend to 
overlap, because the mental ability of the testator is relevant to assessing his 
vulnerability to influence by others. Even if a testator satisfies the low standard 
 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46 cmt. e 
(2011). 
 26. See, e.g., Irene D. Johnson, There’s a Will, But No Way—Whatever Happened to the 
Doctrine of Testamentary Freedom and What Can (Should) We Do to Restore It?, 4 EST. PLAN. 
& COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 105 (2011); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
571 (1997); E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from 
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
275 (1999); Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should Be 
Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245 (2010). 
 27. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 309–13. 
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for testamentary capacity, evidence of diminished mental ability is a relevant 
factor in assessing susceptibility to wrongdoing by a third party.28 
The most important of the conduct doctrines is undue influence. The 
Restatement (Third) of Property says, “A donative transfer is procured by 
undue influence if the influence exerted over the donor overcame the donor’s 
free will and caused the donor to make a donative transfer that the donor would 
not otherwise have made.”29 But what influence is undue? The line between 
indelicate but permissible persuasion and influence that is undue is not always 
clear. Moreover, because direct evidence of undue influence is rare, contestants 
must typically rely on circumstantial evidence. To impose order on the unruly 
concept of undue influence and to clarify the scope of admissible evidence, the 
law has evolved an elaborate scheme of inferences, presumptions, and burden 
shifting that reflect long experience with protecting the decedent’s freedom of 
disposition against imposition by cunning or domineering persons.30 
Although claims of lack of volition have long been the province of will 
contests and actions in restitution, in recent years tort has begun to encroach on 
this turf. In nearly half the states a new tort of interference with inheritance has 
emerged as a rival cause of action for cases involving undue influence, duress, 
or fraud. Some commentators have applauded this development, seeing in the 
tort a useful gap filler, but in my view it is at best a redundancy—and probably 
a pernicious one at that. Because the interference-with-inheritance tort 
recognizes a primary right in a prospective donee to inherit, it is in deep 
tension with the principle of freedom of disposition. And because the tort is 
governed by more lax procedures than in a will contest or restitution action, it 
allows disappointed expectant beneficiaries to plead around the stricter 
procedures that evolved within the law of succession to address the worst 
evidence problem.31 
V.  WILLS: CONSTRUCTION 
A will that is authentic and volitional is entitled to probate. The testator’s 
estate must be distributed in accordance with the terms of the will. This brings 
us to the construction of wills, that is, the process of determining the meaning 
that should be attributed to a will. In accordance with the principle of freedom 
of disposition, “[t]he controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a 
 
 28. A familiar teaching example is Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d 1378, 1384–85 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1995). 
 29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3(b) 
cmt. e (2003). 
 30. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 290–91. 
 31. See John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful 
Interference with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335 (2013). 
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donative document is the donor’s intention.”32 But how should a testator’s 
intention be determined? The words of a will are sometimes ambiguous or may 
suggest an intent different from what other evidence indicates was the 
testator’s actual or likely intent. 
The complication is once again the worst evidence rule whereby the 
witness best able to clarify the meaning of the will is dead by the time the 
question is litigated. Without live testimony from the testator, how should a 
court go about discerning the testator’s intent? Should a court enforce the plain 
meaning of the will, excluding all extrinsic evidence of intent? What if the 
language of the will is ambiguous on its face? What if a seemingly clear 
provision is ambiguous as applied to the facts? What if clear and convincing 
evidence shows that the language of the will is mistaken owing to an innocent 
mistake by the scrivener? Should courts have the power to reform a will to 
correct a mistaken term? 
Under traditional law, compliance with the Wills Act establishes a 
conclusive validation of the written words of the will that may not be 
challenged on the basis of extrinsic evidence of a different intent. Extrinsic 
evidence may be admitted to resolve certain ambiguities, but the plain meaning 
of the words of a will cannot be disturbed by evidence that the testator 
intended another meaning. Courts may not reform a will to correct a mistaken 
term to reflect what the testator intended the will to say. In this way, traditional 
law guards against a spurious finding of mistake (a false positive). But this 
benefit comes at the cost of denying relief even if there is overwhelming 
evidence of mistake and the testator’s actual intent (a false negative). 
To avoid this harsh result, courts have sometimes corrected a mistake 
under the guise of using extrinsic evidence to construe a supposedly 
ambiguous term.33 In other cases, the need to resort to extrinsic evidence was 
too obvious to deny, such as in a bequest of “the sum of two hundred thousand 
dollars ($25,000).”34 Eventually, a movement began toward formally relaxing 
the rules against extrinsic evidence and reformation.35 As in the movement to 
reform execution formalities, the movement to reform construction of wills 
argued for a rebalancing of decision costs and error costs.36 Today the Uniform 
Probate Code, the Restatement (Third) of Property, and a minority but growing 
number of courts permit recourse to extrinsic evidence to clarify and even 
 
 32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1. 
 33. See, e.g., Arnheiter v. Arnheiter, 125 A.2d 914 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1956) 
(construing “No. 304 Harrison Avenue” to mean “No. 317 Harrison Avenue”); In re Estate of 
Gibbs v. Krause, 111 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. 1961) (construing “Robert J. Krause” to mean “Robert 
W. Krause”). 
 34. In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 817 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 35. See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground 
of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982). 
 36. See Kelly, supra note 20, at 889–90. 
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reform the terms of a will.37 Notably, opponents of this movement speak in 
similar functional terms, arguing that traditional law better balances the 
problem of false positives and false negatives.38 
Another difficulty in construing wills stems from the gap in time that 
intervenes between the making of a will and the testator’s death. During this 
gap, which may span years or even decades, circumstances can change in a 
way that renders the will stale or obsolete. A named beneficiary might 
predecease the testator or the nature and scope of the testator’s property might 
change. How is a stale will to be applied to changed circumstances? In these 
cases, if the testator’s actual intent is not evident, courts apply rules of 
construction that are meant to implement the probable intent of the typical 
testator.39 
VI.  TRUSTS: CREATION AND CHARACTERISTICS 
In contemporary practice, trusts have eclipsed wills as the preferred vehicle 
for implementing a donor’s freedom of disposition. A trust is, functionally 
speaking, a legal arrangement created by a settlor in which a trustee holds 
property as a fiduciary for one or more beneficiaries. The trustee takes legal 
title to the trust property, which allows the trustee to deal with third parties as 
owner of the property. The beneficiaries have equitable title to the trust 
property, which allows them to hold the trustee accountable for breach of the 
trustee’s fiduciary duties. The beneficiaries are typically entitled to periodic 
distributions from the trust income and sometimes from the trust principal as 
well. 
Trusts may be testamentary, created by will and arising in probate. Or they 
may be inter vivos, created during the settlor’s life by declaration of trust or by 
deed of trust, often as a will substitute to avoid probate. “The purposes for 
which we can create trusts,” says the leading treatise, “are as unlimited as our 
imagination.”40 These uses range from providing financial support for a 
surviving spouse and children in accordance with their respective needs, to 
structuring commercial enterprises such as mutual funds and asset 
securitization. The key to the trust’s versatility as an instrument for 
 
 37. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS 
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1. 
 38. See, e.g., Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Mass. 2000) (expressing 
concern that reformation “would open the floodfates of litigation and lead to untold confusion in 
the probate of wills”). 
 39. See Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 609 (2009) (surveying doctrines dealing with stale wills). 
 40. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER, 
SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS 4 (4th ed. 2006). 
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conveyance and management of property is that it “separate[s] the benefits of 
ownership from the burdens of ownership.”41 
The typical Trusts and Estates course focuses on the use of the trust in 
gratuitous transfers as a will substitute and as a management device for 
fiduciary administration on behalf of others. In both contexts, the trust 
implements the principle of freedom of disposition by projecting the donor’s 
will across time. But there are important differences. As a will substitute, the 
trust is an instrument of conveyance. As a management device, the trust is used 
to impose ongoing fiduciary intermediation. Owing to these different contexts, 
different rules have developed for each type of trust, in effect a fracturing of 
the trust canon into two distinct branches.42 Still a third branch is the law of 
business trusts,43 but they are rarely mentioned in the Trusts and Estates course 
because they involve an exercise of freedom of contract rather than freedom of 
disposition.44 
Before getting into the law of trust creation, it is useful to consider the 
basic functional elements of a trust; the history of the trust; the sources of 
modern trust law and the role of the great treatises, the Restatements, and the 
uniform laws; the varied uses of the trust in contemporary practice; and the 
bifurcation of ownership that is the hallmark characteristic of the trust 
relationship. Two categories of issues arise from bifurcating legal and 
equitable ownership: (1) the effect on the rights of third parties with respect to 
the trust property and the property of the trustee personally (asset partitioning), 
and (2) the powers and duties of the trustee and the corresponding rights of the 
beneficiaries with respect to the trust property and against the trustee (fiduciary 
administration).45 
The rules governing the creation of a trust are important in their own right 
and because they distinguish the trust from other kinds of property 
arrangements. The creation of a trust requires (1) intent by the settlor to create 
a trust; (2) ascertainable beneficiaries who can enforce the trust; and (3) 
specific property, the res, to be held in trust. In finding the intent needed to 
create a trust, it is useful to draw a distinction between a testamentary trust, to 
which the law governing the construction of wills applies, and an inter vivos 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 583. 
 43. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as “Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 31 (2005); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling 
the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559 (2003); John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust 
as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997). 
 44. In describing these three branches of trust law, I put to the side the constructive trust, 
which is a remedy commonly imposed to prevent unjust enrichment, and the resulting trust, 
which is an equitable reversionary interest. 
 45. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset Partitioning, in 
THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 428 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013). 
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trust, which can arise informally and, if by declaration of trust, without a 
conveyance of property or the involvement of a third party. The requirement of 
an ascertainable beneficiary follows from the basic principle of fiduciary law 
that a fiduciary relationship requires a beneficiary who can call the fiduciary to 
account, and from the fundamental principle of trust law that a private trust 
must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The requirement of specific 
property is what distinguishes a trust from a debt, giving the trust many of its 
asset partitioning, proprietary features.46 
The law of trusts, standing alone, does not require a writing to create a 
trust. An oral inter vivos trust of personal property, whether by declaration or 
by transfer to another as trustee, is permitted.47 However, if the trust is 
testamentary or is to hold land, a writing is usually necessary to satisfy the 
Wills Act or the Statute of Frauds. An oral trust for the disposition of personal 
property at death, although permissible, is in tension with the policy values of 
the Wills Act. And the central policy of the law of restitution, preventing 
unjust enrichment, sometimes calls for relief by way of constructive trust if an 
oral trust fails for noncompliance with the Wills Act or the Statute of Frauds. 
VII.  NONPROBATE TRANSFERS AND PLANNING FOR INCAPACITY 
Having surveyed probate succession by will and by intestacy, and having 
introduced the trust form, we are ready to consider the will substitutes: 
revocable trusts, life insurance and other pay-on-death contracts, pension plans 
and retirement accounts, and other such arrangements that have the effect of 
passing property at death outside of probate. Taken together, the will 
substitutes constitute a nonprobate system of private succession that competes 
with the public probate system.48 More wealth passes by way of will 
substitutes than in probate. 
The rise of private succession raises two legal questions that have vexed 
courts and policymakers. First, must a will substitute be executed with Wills 
Act formalities to be valid? Should the evidentiary, protective, cautionary, and 
channeling policies of the Wills Act apply to will substitutes? Are those 
policies served by alternative formalities or, for some will substitutes, the 
presence of a neutral financial intermediary? The prevailing view in modern 
law is that the will substitutes are valid even if not executed with Wills Act 
formalities.49 
 
 46. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998). 
 47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 20 (2003). 
 48. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of 
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984). 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1 
(2003). 
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Second, to what extent should the subsidiary law of wills apply to will 
substitutes? By subsidiary law of wills I refer both to policy-based substantive 
limits on testation by will, such as creditors’ rights and the forced share for a 
surviving spouse, and to rules of construction, such as antilapse, simultaneous 
death, and revocation on divorce. The Restatement (Third) of Property says 
that the subsidiary law of wills is applicable to a will substitute “to the extent 
appropriate.”50 But what criteria should apply in determining appropriateness? 
Are there circumstances in which a person should be able to avoid a creditor’s 
claim or a spouse’s forced share by reconfiguring his or her transfer to take the 
form of a will substitute? And what of the rules of construction, which evolved 
out of long experience with interpreting and administering testamentary 
dispositions in accordance with the donor’s probable intent? Each will 
substitute is governed by its own field of law, such as contract law or trust law, 
which may be in conflict with the law of wills. How should such conflicts be 
resolved? An added complication is that most pensions and life insurance 
policies that are obtained as a benefit of employment are governed by federal 
law, which preempts state law.51 
As a practical matter, the use of multiple will substitutes can result in an 
estate plan that lacks coordination. Many will substitutes are asset specific, but 
sensible estate planning is holistic. To deal with this problem, many lawyers 
recommend creating a revocable trust and making it the beneficiary of the 
client’s will (a “pour-over will”) and various will substitutes.52 The revocable 
trust has thus emerged as the successor to the will as the centerpiece in 
contemporary estate planning. 
To adapt the trust to this use, the law of revocable trusts has evolved into a 
distinct branch of trust law.53 Canonical authority tells us that a trust is a 
fiduciary relationship in which a trustee holds title to certain property subject 
to fiduciary duties to administer it for the benefit of one or more 
beneficiaries.54 Yet in modern law a revocable trust need not have property, at 
least not initially, if it is to be funded by a pour-over will.55 Moreover, the 
trustee of a revocable trust does not owe fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, 
but rather is subject to the control of the settlor for as long as the trust remains 
 
 50. Id. § 7.2. 
 51. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). 
 52. The vernacular of American trust practice reifies the trust, referring to it as if it were an 
entity. Although technically incorrect, reifying the trust provides a convenient shorthand, “the 
trust,” for the technically correct but more awkward locution of “the trustee acting in his fiduciary 
capacity as trustee.” See Sitkoff, supra note 45, at 436. 
 53. This is reflected in Article 6 of the Uniform Trust Code, which is “among the Code’s 
most important and innovative provisions.” David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): 
Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 186 (2002). 
 54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003). 
 55. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-511 (2008). 
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revocable.56 In modern practice, therefore, a revocable trust is little more than a 
nonprobate will that avoids the burdens of probate in a manner reminiscent of 
how trusts were once used to defeat primogeniture and the feudal incidents.57 
The emphasis on revocable trusts in nonprobate transfers provides a segue, 
albeit imperfect, to the challenge of planning for the possibility of a person’s 
future incapacity.58 It is a sad fact of the human condition that a period of 
mental and physical decay may precede death in old age. Planning for 
incapacity is therefore as much a part of estate planning practice as planning 
for death. Such planning should address both property management and health 
care decision making for an incapacitated person. Today there are statutory 
default rules for these matters, but proper planning will displace those rules by 
way of revocable trusts, durable powers of attorney, and health care directives. 
The imposition of a conservatorship or guardianship is a deprivation of liberty 
that requires due process.59 Avoiding such a proceeding by advance planning is 
in effect a waiver of that process. 
VIII.  LIMITS ON FREEDOM OF DISPOSITION: 
PROTECTION OF THE SPOUSE AND CHILDREN 
As we have seen, the American law of succession is built on the principle 
of freedom of disposition. But this principle is not absolute. In all but one of 
the separate property states, a surviving spouse is entitled to an elective or 
forced share, typically one-third, of the decedent spouse’s estate. In the 
community property states, each spouse owns all earnings during the marriage 
in equal, undivided shares. There is no elective share because the surviving 
spouse already owns half of the couple’s community property. Waiver of these 
marital property rules is permitted, hence premarital and marital agreements 
are as much a part of trusts and estates practice as they are matrimonial 
practice. 
Although there is general agreement across the states on the basic policy of 
protecting spouses, there is wide variation in the particulars. Many of the 
differences reflect a lack of consensus on whether such protections derive from 
a marital support obligation or rather are based on a partnership theory of 
marriage. The partnership theory points toward giving a surviving separate 
property spouse one-half of the decedent’s property acquired during the 
 
 56. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (rev. 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74. 
 57. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 387. 
 58. Perhaps a more natural fit would be to address this subject in connection with planning 
to avoid will contests and testamentary capacity, see supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text, 
but at that early stage the students have not yet been exposed to revocable trusts or the concept of 
fiduciary obligation. 
 59. Even the modern Uniform Probate Code provides for an elaborate court procedure to 
protect an alleged incompetent. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-406. 
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marriage, mirroring the outcome in a community property state. The support 
theory, by contrast, would tend to justify a smaller percentage but would apply 
it to all of the decedent’s property. It might also justify the survivor receiving 
all of the decedent’s property up to a certain minimum amount or considering 
other resources available to the survivor. Which of these theories will give a 
surviving spouse a larger amount depends on the aggregate value of the 
decedent’s property and how much of it was acquired during the marriage. 
Another source of divergence, raising an interesting question of the role of 
courts versus legislatures in the making of elective share policy, is the extent to 
which the elective share applies to nonprobate property. The original elective 
share statutes gave the surviving spouse a third of the decedent’s estate. In this 
context, the term estate was understood to mean the probate estate. With the 
increasing importance of nonprobate modes of transfer, the question arises 
whether the elective share should also apply to nonprobate transfers. For a 
time, it appeared that courts might gloss the elective share statutes to bring in 
nonprobate transfers.60 But more recent cases, reflecting the displacement of 
purposive interpretation by textualism, have held that the elective share applies 
only to those nonprobate transfers, if any, that are specifically enumerated in 
the state’s elective share statute.61 
In contrast to the surviving spouse, in the American legal tradition a 
surviving child has no rights to a mandatory share. A property owner may 
disinherit his or her blood relations, including children.62 This rule stands in 
stark contrast with the other common law countries, where courts may override 
a testator’s will for a child or other dependent of the testator.63 
Both separate property and community property states protect a 
pretermitted surviving spouse from accidental disinheritance by way of a 
premarital will that the decedent spouse neglected to update after the marriage. 
American law also protects a child who is accidently omitted from a will, such 
as child born after the execution of a will that does not contemplate subsequent 
children. But these statutes provide for default rules that may be overcome by 
express language in the will. The pretermitted heir statutes are therefore not 
limitations on freedom of disposition, but rather are meant to implement it. 
They are best understood as stale will doctrines, implementing the probable 
 
 60. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1984). 
 61. See, e.g., In re Estate of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2012); In re Estate of George, 265 
P.3d 222 (Wyo. 2011); Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 2003). 
 62. See Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and 
a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1197–1200 
(1990). 
 63. See, e.g., Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975, c. 63, § 1 (Eng. 
& Wales). 
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intent of the typical testator in dealing with changes in circumstances in the 
gap between a will’s execution and the testator’s death.64 
IX.  TRUSTS: FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION 
The hallmark characteristic of a common law trust is bifurcation: the 
trustee holds legal title to the trust property, and the beneficiaries have 
equitable or beneficial ownership. This separation of legal and beneficial 
ownership offers many advantages. For example, property transferred in trust 
during life avoids probate at the settlor’s death. Because the trustee holds legal 
title to the property, there is no need to change title by probate administration 
upon the settlor’s death. Another advantage, characteristic of an irrevocable 
trust, is fiduciary intermediation between the beneficiary and the trust property. 
The trust is therefore a powerful tool for implementing a donor’s freedom of 
disposition across time. 
By making a transfer in trust rather than outright, a settlor ensures that the 
property will be managed and distributed in accordance with his or her wishes 
as expressed in the terms of the trust rather than the whims of the beneficiaries. 
A trust also allows the settlor to postpone important decisions about the 
investment and distribution of the trust property. Instead of imposing inflexible 
instructions in advance, the settlor may empower the trustee to decide how the 
property should be invested and distributed in light of changing market 
conditions and the beneficiaries’ evolving circumstances and capabilities. 
The intermediary role of the trustee involves custody, administration, 
investment, and distribution of the trust property in accordance with the terms 
of the trust.65 The custodial function involves taking custody of the trust 
property and properly safeguarding it. The administrative function includes 
accounting and recordkeeping, as well as making tax and other required filings. 
The investment function involves reviewing the trust assets and making and 
implementing an investment program for those assets as part of an overall 
strategy reasonably suited to the purpose of the trust and the circumstances of 
the beneficiaries. The distribution function involves making disbursements of 
income or principal to the beneficiaries in accordance with the terms of the 
trust. In contemporary practice, naming a professional trustee and dividing the 
functions of trusteeship among different persons has become increasingly 
common. 
 
 64. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 65. The four functions noted above are an extension of the three suggested in John H. 
Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
641, 665 (1996). 
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Empowering the trustee, however, puts the beneficiaries at the peril of 
mismanagement or even misappropriation—a problem of agency costs.66 In the 
days of yore, when the trust was used more for conveying land than for 
ongoing administration of property, trust law minimized agency costs by 
giving the trustee only limited powers. In modern practice, in which trusts are 
commonly used to facilitate ongoing management of property on behalf of the 
beneficiaries, the trustee is given broad powers of administration, but the 
exercise of those powers is subject to the trustee’s fiduciary duties.67 The 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts characterizes this as “a basic principle of trust 
administration,” namely, that “a trustee presumptively has comprehensive 
powers to manage the trust estate and otherwise to carry out the terms and 
purpose of the trust, but that all powers held in the capacity of trustee must be 
exercised, or not exercised, in accordance with the trustee’s fiduciary 
obligations.”68 
Accordingly, the purpose of trust fiduciary law is to suppress agency costs 
by inducing the trustee to adhere to the terms of the trust and to act prudently 
and in the best interests of the beneficiaries.69 Viewed in this manner, the 
fiduciary governance strategy of modern trust law is intuitive. The functional 
core is deterrence. The fiduciary is induced to act in the best interests of the 
beneficiary by the threat of after-the-fact liability for breach of fiduciary duty. 
The core fiduciary duties are the duties of loyalty and prudence. The duty of 
loyalty proscribes misappropriation and regulates conflicts of interest by 
requiring the fiduciary to act in the sole interests of the beneficiaries. The duty 
of prudence prescribes the fiduciary’s standard of care by establishing an 
objective prudence or reasonableness standard the meaning of which is 
informed by industry norms and practices. 
Accumulated experience with recurring, common sets of facts and 
circumstances has led to the development of a host of implementing or 
subsidiary rules. These rules flesh out the duties of loyalty and prudence as 
applied to recurring circumstances for which customary practice has hardened 
into rules of law. The no-further-inquiry rule and its proliferating exceptions 
are an example. Another is the prudent investor rule, which is a specification of 
the duty of prudence in the investment function.70 Still other examples are the 
 
 66. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621 
(2004). 
 67. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 
640, 642 (1995) (explaining the rise of fiduciary law as a substitute for limited powers to 
safeguard the beneficiary). 
 68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 70 cmt. a (2003). 
 69. This discussion is derived from Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary 
Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1042–43 (2011). 
 70. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment 
Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. & ECON. 681 (2007); Langbein, supra note 65. 
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duties to collect and protect trust property; to earmark that property as 
belonging to the trust and not comingle it with the trustee’s own property; to 
keep adequate records of the trust property and the administration of the trust; 
and to bring and defend claims held in trust. Yet another subsidiary rule, of 
significant practical relevance, is the duty of the trustee to make affirmative 
disclosure to the beneficiary of nonroutine transactions and other significant 
developments in the administration of the trust.71 
In the event of a breach of duty by a trustee, the beneficiary is entitled to 
an election among remedies that include compensatory damages to restore the 
trust estate and trust distributions to what they would have been but for the 
breach. In addition, the beneficiary is entitled to disgorge the trustee of any 
profit made on the transaction. The justification for compensation is that the 
beneficiary is entitled to be made whole for any losses incurred or gains 
foregone owing to the breach. But compensatory damages will not deter breach 
if the gains to the breaching party exceed the nonbreaching party’s loss. The 
availability of a disgorgement remedy, which allows the beneficiary to take the 
trustee’s gain even in excess of making the trust whole, reflects the additional 
deterrent and disclosure purposes of fiduciary law. Because the trustee is not 
entitled to keep the gains from breach, the trustee is deterred from unilateral 
breach, and is instead given an incentive to disclose the potential gains from 
breach and seek the beneficiary’s consent.72 In effect, the (penalty) default rule 
in trust fiduciary law is that all profits by the trustee traceable to the fiduciary 
relationship are held in trust unless agreed otherwise. The law in this area 
denies the possibility, permitted in contract law, of unilateral efficient breach. 
Thus far I have been speaking of the trustee’s fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries. This is consistent with traditional doctrine, under which a 
beneficiary or a co-trustee, but not the settlor, has standing to sue the trustee 
for breach of duty.73 But is not the creation of a trust an exercise of the settlor’s 
freedom of disposition? Should not the settlor’s intent prevail over the wishes 
of the beneficiary? Elsewhere I have argued that: 
[T]he law should minimize the agency costs inherent in locating managerial 
authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the beneficiaries, but only 
to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of the 
settlor. This qualification gives priority to the settlor over the beneficiaries as 
the trustee’s primary principal. [My] positive claim is that, at least with respect 
 
 71. The leading case is Allard v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 663 P.2d 104, 110 (Wash. 1983) (en 
banc). Examples of significant developments are collected in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 82 cmt. d. 
 72. This discussion is derived from Sitkoff, supra note 69, at 1048–49. 
 73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(1). 
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to traditional doctrines, the law conforms to the suggested normative 
approach.74 
In many respects American trust law does indeed regard the settlor as the 
primary principal. A beneficiary cannot easily remove the trustee, modify or 
terminate the trust without the settlor’s consent, or alienate his or her beneficial 
interest. On each of those questions, American law honors the settlor’s 
freedom of disposition over the wishes of the beneficiary. On the other hand, 
some of the most contentious current issues in the law of trust fiduciary 
administration, including whether the settlor may completely negate the 
trustee’s duties to diversify and to give information to the beneficiaries,75 are 
about policy limitations on freedom of disposition. 
X.  TRUSTS: ALIENATION AND MODIFICATION 
By giving property to a trustee to hold in a fiduciary capacity, rather than 
giving it outright to a beneficiary, a settlor ensures that the property will be 
managed and distributed in accordance with his or her wishes as expressed in 
the terms of the trust. But what are the limits on a settlor’s freedom of 
disposition by way of a trust? Three recurring issues within the law of trusts, 
each relating to alienation or modification of the beneficial interest, raise this 
question. 
The first is the extent to which a settlor may impose a restraint on 
alienation of a beneficial interest. In all common law jurisdictions, a 
beneficiary of a discretionary trust cannot alienate his or her beneficial interest 
and a creditor of the beneficiary cannot compel the trustee to make a 
distribution. But American law goes further, recognizing a spendthrift trust. A 
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust cannot transfer his or her beneficial interest 
and his or her creditors cannot attach it, and this is true even if the beneficiary 
has a present right to a mandatory distribution. 
The rationale for permitting a spendthrift trust, created by the settlor’s 
imposition of a disabling restraint on alienation of the beneficial interest, is 
 
 74. Sitkoff, supra note 66, at 683–84. For discussion by others, some critical of my views, 
see, e.g., M. W. LAU, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRUSTS (2011); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295 (1988); Alan Newman, 
The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 
AKRON L. REV. 649 (2005); Lee-ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory 
of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579 (2011). 
 75. Regarding diversification, compare John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s 
Limits on the Settlor’s Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375 (2010), with Jeffrey A. 
Cooper, Shades of Gray: Applying the Benefit-the-Beneficiaries Rule to Trust Investment 
Directives, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2383 (2010). Regarding information, see, e.g., Frances H. Foster, 
Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555 (2008); T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 
N.C. L. REV. 1595 (2007). 
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firmly rooted in freedom of disposition. Justice Miller’s dictum in Nichols v. 
Eaton is the famous early statement: 
Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property in 
securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills of 
life, the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improvidence, or incapacity 
for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived.76 
In a later case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court elaborated: 
It is always to be remembered that consideration for the beneficiary does not 
even in the remotest way enter into the policy of the law. It has regard solely to 
the rights of the donor. Spendthrift trusts can have no other justification than is 
to be found in considerations affecting the donor alone. They allow the donor 
to so control his bounty, through the creation of the trust, that it may be exempt 
from liability for the donee’s debts, not because the law is concerned to keep 
the donee from wasting it, but because it is concerned to protect the donor’s 
right of property.77 
With the validity of the spendthrift trust now settled in American law, the 
policy debate today concerns whether to make exceptions for certain kinds of 
creditors, such as spouses and children or tort victims. The trend, reflected in 
the Uniform Trust Code, is to allow claims by spouses and children but not tort 
victims.78 A related question, recently put into issue by novel legislation in 
several domestic and offshore jurisdictions, is whether to allow creditors of the 
settlor recourse against a self-settled asset protection trust in which the settlor 
retains a beneficial interest. To that extent, such a trust is not an exercise of 
freedom of disposition.79 
The second issue concerns the power of a court to modify or terminate a 
trust. In accordance with the principle of freedom of disposition, American law 
has traditionally recognized only two grounds for judicial modification or 
termination of a trust without the settlor’s consent: (1) by consent of all the 
beneficiaries if the modification or termination is not contrary to a material 
purpose of the settlor (the Claflin doctrine), and (2) changed circumstances not 
anticipated by the settlor that would defeat or substantially impair the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust (the equitable deviation doctrine). 
The material purpose rule reflects a policy judgment that the settlor’s 
 
 76. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 727 (1875). 
 77. In re Morgan’s Estate, 72 A. 498, 499 (Pa. 1909). 
 78. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 (rev. 2010). 
 79. In Phillips v. Moore, 690 S.E.2d 620, 621 (Ga. 2010), the court quoted an earlier case 
thus: “The invalidity of self-settled spendthrift trusts stems from the idea that no settlor . . . should 
be permitted to put his own assets in a trust, of which he is [a] beneficiary, and shield those assets 
with a spendthrift clause, because to do so is merely shifting the settlor’s assets from one pocket 
to another, in an attempt to avoid creditors.” 
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“intentions ought to be carried out.”80 Deviation protects the settlor’s intentions 
against frustration by unanticipated changes in circumstances. Both doctrines 
are therefore firmly rooted in freedom of disposition.81 In this respect 
American trust law is in stark contrast with English trust law, in which the 
beneficiaries have the right “to overbear and defeat the intention of a testator or 
settlor.”82 
The third issue concerns trustee removal. The policy question is how to 
give the trustee enough leeway to carry out the settlor’s wishes without 
protecting lackadaisical or ineffective administration.83 The balance struck by 
traditional law is to permit removal only for cause. A court would remove a 
trustee who was dishonest or who had committed a serious breach of trust, but 
not one whose breach was minor or who had a simple disagreement with the 
beneficiary. Some have argued that the inability of beneficiaries to change 
trustees lessens competition among trust companies, contributes to higher 
trustees’ fees, and leads to a cautious, even indifferent, style of trust 
management.84 Modern law, reflected in the Uniform Trust Code, permits 
removal of a trustee by consent of all the beneficiaries if in the best interests of 
the beneficiaries and not contrary to a material purpose of the settlor.85 This 
reform, which privileges the material purpose of the settlor, is thus a 
recalibration of how best to implement the intent of the settlor across time. 
XI.  TRUSTS: CHARITABLE PURPOSES, CY PRES, AND SUPERVISION 
Through a charitable trust, a person can make a gift in support of a 
charitable purpose across time. In general, the same rules that apply to the 
formation and administration of a private trust also apply to a charitable trust. 
But there are three significant exceptions that differentiate a charitable trust 
from a private trust.86 
 
 80. Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889). 
 81. Recent law reform has somewhat liberalized these rules. But most of the reforms 
preserve the overall aim of implementing the probable intent of the settlor. The main exception is 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2) (2003), which authorizes modification or termination 
by consent of the beneficiaries if the reason for modification or termination outweighs any 
conflicting material purpose of the settlor. This is a controversial provision, one that is more 
aggressive than the California statute on which it is based, and it is rejected by the Uniform Trust 
Code. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 723–24. 
 82. Goulding v. James, [1997] 2 All E.R. 239 (A.C.) at [247] (Eng.); see also DUKEMINIER 
& SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 718–19. 
 83. See Sitkoff, supra note 66, at 663–64. 
 84. See, e.g., Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under 
the Uniform Trust Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lens Help Clarify the 
Rights of Beneficiaries?, 67 MO. L. REV. 241, 249 (2002). 
 85. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(4) (rev. 2010). 
 86. Most charities today are structured as nonprofit corporations rather than as charitable 
trusts. However, much of the basic law of charitable gifts, nonprofit corporations, and charitable 
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First, a charitable trust must be for a recognized charitable purpose rather 
than for one or more ascertainable beneficiaries. “A charitable trust may be 
created for the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, the 
promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes, or other purposes 
the achievement of which is beneficial to the community.”87 The necessity of a 
charitable purpose, as compared to an ascertainable beneficiary, is the 
fundamental distinction between a private trust and a charitable trust. In 
modern law, however, trusts for certain noncharitable purposes, such as the 
care of a pet animal or the perpetual care of a grave, are also recognized, 
reflecting a further expansion of freedom of disposition. 
Second, because a charitable trust is exempt from the Rule Against 
Perpetuities and so may endure forever, it is more freely modified under the cy 
pres doctrine. Cy pres is shorthand for the Norman French phrase cy pres 
comme possible, meaning “as nearly as possible.” Under the cy pres doctrine, 
if a charitable trust’s specific purpose becomes illegal, impossible, or 
impracticable, the court may direct the application of the trust property to 
another charitable purpose that approximates the settlor’s general charitable 
intent. Modern law has come to recognize wastefulness as an additional 
grounds for cy pres. Cy pres addresses the risk that, because a charitable trust 
may have a perpetual existence, changed circumstances will render the trust’s 
original purpose obsolete. The doctrine implements freedom of disposition by 
accounting for subsequent developments in accordance with the settlor’s 
general charitable intent. 
Third, because a charitable trust does not require an ascertainable 
beneficiary, traditional law relies on the state attorney general to ensure that 
the trustee remains loyal to the settlor’s charitable purpose and refrains from 
abuse or breach of duty. Under traditional law, the settlor does not have 
standing to enforce a charitable trust unless she retains an interest in it. But is 
supervision by the state attorneys general sufficient? The state attorney general 
is a political official, typically elected, with neither a personal financial stake 
nor, in the usual case, a political stake in the operation of a charitable trust.88 
 
foundations derives from the law of charitable trusts. Accordingly, the questions of law and 
policy for charitable trusts apply generally across the entire charity and nonprofit sector, which is 
massive. In 2010, public charitable organizations reported total assets of $2.71 trillion and 
revenue of $1.51 trillion. The nonprofit sector is estimated to have contributed $804.8 billion to 
the U.S. economy that year, representing 5.5 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. See 
Amy S. Blackwood, Katie L. Roeger & Sarah L. Pettijohn, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Public 
Charities, Giving, and Volunteering, 2012, URBAN INST. (2010), http://www.urban.org/Uploaded 
PDF/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief.pdf. 
 87. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(a). 
 88. This discussion draws on Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable 
Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 
781–82 (2008). 
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Unless an alleged breach of trust obtains enough media attention to achieve 
political salience, actual scrutiny of a charitable trust by the attorney general is 
unlikely. In the usual case there is not enough of a political payoff to the 
attorney general to warrant the diversion of resources from other initiatives. 
The mirror-image worry is that when the attorney general does intervene in 
response to political pressure, he or she will be tempted to promote his or her 
political interests at the expense of the trust’s charitable purpose. 
Dissatisfaction with supervision of charitable trusts by state attorneys general 
has led to a reconsideration, in accordance with freedom of disposition, of the 
rule against settlor standing.89 
XII.  TRUSTS: POWERS OF APPOINTMENT 
Earlier we considered trusts in which the settlor preserves flexibility by 
giving the trustee fiduciary discretion over future distributions of trust 
property. The settlor may also give to someone other than the trustee a 
nonfiduciary power to distribute trust property. Such a power is known as a 
power of appointment. The holder of a power of appointment, known as the 
donee, may appoint the property to one or more persons, known as the objects, 
in accordance with the terms of the power. 
Consider a typical example: H devises property to X in trust to distribute 
the income quarterly to W for life, and on W’s death to distribute the principal 
to one or more of H’s descendants as W shall appoint in her will. H is the 
donor of a power of appointment, W is the donee, and H’s descendants are the 
objects. By this power, which W holds in a nonfiduciary capacity, W may 
decide who among H’s descendants will take the trust property at her death. In 
this way, H empowers W to deal flexibly with changing circumstances in the 
interim between their deaths, which may span years or even decades. W can 
take into account births, deaths, marriages, and divorces; the evolving ability 
of children and more remote descendants to manage property; changes in the 
economy and investment returns; changes in the law; and other circumstances 
that H could not have foreseen but that W will observe firsthand. 
Powers of appointment provide benefits beyond building flexibility into an 
estate plan. They are also commonly used for tax planning and asset 
protection. In the example given in the prior paragraph, because W cannot 
appoint the trust property for her own benefit, no estate or gift tax will be due 
upon W’s exercise of the power, and no creditor of W will have recourse 
against the property. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of powers 
of appointment in contemporary estate planning, that is, in the practical 
implementation of the donor’s freedom of disposition. 
 
 89. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c). 
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XIII.  TRUSTS: CONSTRUCTION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 
The Anglo-American system of estates and future interests allows a donor 
extraordinary latitude in crafting a transfer of property to be shared by multiple 
beneficiaries across time. Several generations ago, law schools commonly 
required a course on the subject. In those days, most future interests were given 
outright, that is, they were legal. Today, future interests almost always arise in 
trusts, that is, they are equitable. In expanding, trust practice has annexed the 
law of estates and future interests, transforming it into a question of drafting 
and construing trust instruments. 
Consider a simple example: suppose O wants to give certain property to 
his children and then down the generations. In the past, O might have given a 
life estate in the property to his children, a remainder for life to his 
grandchildren, and so on, for as long as the Rule Against Perpetuities would 
allow. Today, this transfer is almost always made in trust. Lawyers who deal 
with trusts must therefore be familiar with the law of future interests, including 
common constructional and other problems with their use. 
The core conceptual idea underlying the law of future interests is that a 
future interest is itself a form of property. The owner of a future interest may 
transfer it. Creditors may seize it. At the owner’s death, it passes in probate or 
by will substitute. What distinguishes a future interest from a present interest is 
that the owner of a future interest does not have a current right to possession or 
enjoyment of the property. 
The question in trust practice is how to tailor future interests to achieve a 
settlor’s intent and how to avoid intent-defeating technical rules and common 
problems caused by ambiguous language. Although the law of future interests 
provides tremendous flexibility in multigenerational gratuitous transfers, some 
of the rules in this area are relics of medieval feudalism that can wreck a 
dispositive plan if the drafter is not alert to them.90 
XIV.  THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND TRUST DURATION 
Freedom of disposition, the organizing principle of the American law of 
succession, is as we have seen not absolute. Perhaps the most storied policy 
limit on freedom of disposition is the Rule Against Perpetuities. Along with 
two related doctrines that also curb the reach of the dead hand—the rule 
against suspension of the power of alienation and the rule against 
accumulations of income—the Rule Against Perpetuities is the main constraint 
on trust duration. 
 
 90. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal for 
Legislative Action, 85 HARV. L. REV. 729, 729–32 (1972); see also D. Benjamin Barros, Toward 
a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 4 (2009); T.P. Gallanis, 
The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513, 514 (2003). 
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The Rule Against Perpetuities requires all interests, whether in trust or 
otherwise, to vest or fail within the lives of everyone who could possibly have 
been known to the donor (“lives in being”) plus the minority of the next 
generation (“plus twenty-one years”).91 Sir Arthur Hobhouse famously 
explained the rationale for this period thus: 
A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons and events 
which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know or see. 
Within the former province we may trust his natural affections and his capacity 
of judgment to make better dispositions than any external Law is likely to 
make for him. Within the latter, natural affection does not extend, and the 
wisest judgment is constantly baffled by the course of events.92 
Property cannot be subjected to contingencies for longer than the perpetuities 
period. In this way, the Rule imposes a time limit on freedom of disposition 
and so the reach of the dead hand. 
The Rule Against Perpetuities is said to have two main purposes: (1) 
keeping property marketable, and (2) limiting dead hand control. Property 
cannot be conveyed with clear title unless all persons with an interest in the 
property agree to the conveyance. By requiring that the identity of all persons 
with a claim on property be ascertained within the perpetuities period, the Rule 
ensures that the property will become marketable periodically. The second 
purpose, limiting dead hand control, is perhaps best understood in light of the 
disagreeable consequences that can arise from property arrangements made 
obsolete by changes in circumstances. By forbidding contingencies that might 
remain unresolved beyond lives in being plus twenty-one years, the Rule puts 
an outer boundary of roughly 100 years or so on the temporal reach of the dead 
hand. 
Although there may still be consensus in favor of the underlying policy 
aims of the Rule Against Perpetuities, its particulars have come under attack. 
At common law, any interest that might not vest or fail within the perpetuities 
period was void from the outset no matter how implausible the invalidating 
possibility. “It is at this point that the rule becomes a trap to the draftsman. 
Many perfectly reasonable dispositions are stricken down because on some 
outside chance not foreseen by the testator or his lawyer it is mathematically 
possible that the vesting might occur too remotely.”93 The fertile octogenarian, 
unborn widow, and other such infamous absurdities that have brought the Rule 
 
 91. The classic formulation comes from JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942): “No interest is good unless it must 
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the 
interest.” 
 92. ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND: ADDRESSES ON THE SUBJECT OF ENDOWMENTS 
AND SETTLEMENTS OF PROPERTY 188 (1880). 
 93. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 643 (1938). 
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into disrepute are products of the merciless and unyielding logic of the 
common law Rule. 
Today, every state has reformed the Rule in one way or another. Many of 
these reforms, such as the wait-and-see doctrine, are meant to honor the Rule’s 
basic purpose, but not all. Most strikingly, as a consequence of the competition 
across the states for trust business, more than half the states have abrogated the 
Rule to allow for a perpetual trust.94 As a consequence, “Congress has come to 
be in charge of trust duration. The future of perpetual trusts is in its hands, to 
be dealt with through the tax system.”95 
XV.  WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 
Probably the most important limitation on freedom of disposition in 
contemporary practice is the federal wealth transfer tax system: the gift, estate, 
and generation-skipping transfer taxes of the Internal Revenue Code. 
In the early history of the United States, death taxes were levied only 
temporarily during times of urgent need for revenue such as war. The estate tax 
as we know it today did not appear until World War I, to finance that war, but 
Congress chose not to repeal the tax when the fighting stopped. The tax was 
retained in part in response to public hostility toward the enormous family 
fortunes. During the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
captured the mood of the country when he declared: 
The desire to provide security for one’s self and one’s family is natural and 
wholesome, but it is adequately served by a reasonable inheritance. Great 
accumulations of wealth cannot be justified on the basis of personal and family 
security. In the last analysis such accumulations amount to the perpetuation of 
great and undesirable concentration of control in a relatively few individuals 
over the employment and welfare of many, many others. Such inherited 
economic power is as inconsistent with the ideals of this generation as 
inherited political power was inconsistent with the ideals of the generation 
which established our Government.96 
The debate over the principle of freedom of disposition, and its role in 
perpetuating inequalities of wealth, is today a question of federal tax policy. 
In 1932, Congress added the gift tax to prevent avoidance of the estate tax 
(and the income tax) through inter vivos transfers to children and others.97 In 
1976, the gift and estate tax systems were unified, so that one rate schedule 
 
 94. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for 
Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005). 
 95. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 
1303, 1343 (2003). 
 96. H.R. REP. NO. 74–1681, at 2 (1935). 
 97. See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and Gift Taxation, 9 
FLA. TAX REV. 875, 879 (2010). 
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applied to cumulative gratuitous transfers in excess of a threshold amount, 
whether the transfer was inter vivos or testamentary. In 1986, to ensure a 
wealth transfer tax at each generation, Congress enacted the generation-
skipping transfer tax. 
The expansion of the federal wealth transfer tax system shifted into reverse 
in 2001, when Congress passed legislation that phased out the estate tax by 
raising the threshold for taxation and lowering the tax rate over the following 
nine years. In 2001, estates in excess of $1 million were taxed at a rate of 55 
percent. By 2010, the estate tax disappeared entirely, making 2010 a tax-
efficient year in which to die.98 The 2001 legislation had a sunset clause, 
however, so that in 2011 the estate tax would return to its 2001 level. But late 
in 2010, before that clause took effect, Congress passed superseding legislation 
that imposed a 35 percent tax in 2011 and 2012 on estates in excess of $5 
million (indexed for inflation). Like the 2001 legislation, the 2010 legislation 
had a sunset clause so that in 2013 the estate tax would return to its 2001 
level.99 But then on New Year’s Day 2013, Congress made permanent an 
estate tax on estates in excess of $5 million (indexed for inflation) at a rate of 
40 percent.100 As of this writing in 2014, the inflation-adjusted threshold for 
taxation is $5.34 million. 
The federal wealth transfer taxes do not generate much revenue. In fiscal 
year 2012, the estate tax raised $12.3 billion, and the gift tax raised $2.1 
billion, for a total of roughly $14.4 billion—akin to a rounding error in the 
total $2.5 trillion in internal revenue collected by the federal government in 
that year.101 Even when rates were higher and the threshold amount for 
taxation was lower, the total take was quite modest. 
Critics argue that wealth transfer taxes are more trouble than they are 
worth, that in effect they are a lawyer tax on the wealthy that distorts lifetime 
 
 98. There is some evidence that death is tax sensitive. Two studies have found changes in 
death rates around the time of changes in estate tax rules such that living longer or dying sooner 
would have a substantial tax consequence. As the authors of these studies concede, however, it is 
possible that some of the observed changes in death timing could reflect tax-motivated fraud in 
the reporting of the death date. See Joshua S. Gans & Andrew Leigh, Did the Death of Australian 
Inheritance Taxes Affect Deaths?, 6 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 1 (2006); Wojceich 
Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Dying to Save Taxes: Evidence from Estate-Tax Returns on the Death 
Elasticity, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 256, 264 (2003). 
 99. Why the sunset clauses, necessitating fresh legislation every few years? See Edward J. 
McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 21, 23 
(2012). 
 100. See The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 
(2013). 
 101. These figures are derived from estimates by the Statistics of Income Division of the IRS, 
per the 2012 Excel table found at SOI Tax Stats—Gross Collections by Type of Tax—IRS Date 
Book Table 6, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Gross-Collections-by-Type-of-Tax-
IRS-Data-Book-Table-6 (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
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savings and consumption while dulling useful incentives toward productivity. 
Supporters counter that, even if these taxes do not raise much revenue, they 
nonetheless add progressivity to the overall tax system, prevent plutocracy, 
make up for holes in the income tax (in particular for unrealized capital 
gains102), and encourage charitable giving.103 Viewed in this manner, the 
debate over transfer tax policy is a debate over the proper scope of freedom of 
disposition, the implementation of which is the object of the law of succession. 
 
 
 102. See James M. Poterba & Scott Weisbenner, The Distributional Burden of Taxing Estates 
and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 422, 450 
(William G. Gale, James R. Hines, Jr. & Joel Slemrod eds., 2001). 
 103. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 297 (3d ed. 2004); see also 
Louis Kaplow, On the Taxation of Private Transfers, 63 TAX L. REV. 159, 185 (2009); Anne L. 
Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469, 492 (2007); James 
R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 854 (2001); Edward J. 
McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 299 (1994); 
Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 269–70 (1983). 
